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ABSTRACT
In a client-server environment that deals with multiple clients,  
there  is  a  need  to  provide  a  mechanism  on  the  server  to 
manage  the  issuance  of  the  client  credentials  for  security  
authorization.  Credentials  created  using  a  particular  own 
platform  identities  and  functions  as  an  authentication  
credentials  to  authenticate  the  platform itself  in  a  network  
communication.  However,  these  credentials  can  easily  be 
shared,  copied  and  stolen.  This  will  led  to  an  anonymous 
service sharing and worst to come when the stolen credentials  
is using for phishing attacks to the original user. One solution  
to the problem is to use tamper-resistant hardware to which a  
credential  is  bound  such  that  a  credential  can  only  be  
generated and used in connection with the hardware. For that,  
manufacturers have started to embed into computers a tamper-
resistant piece of hardware, called trusted platform modules  
(TPM),  as  specified  by  the Trusted  Computing Group.  This 
mechanism insures that credentials can only be issued with the 
TPM existence in the platform thus guarantees the platform 
origins.  This paper describes the component involved in the  
credential  issuance method by the server  trusted computing 
domain.  To  implement  our  approach,  a  client  server  
application  is  used  as  an  interface  through  the  secure  
communication channel in credential request.  The server acts  
as  a  Trusted  Third  Party  to  verify  authorized  users  in  this  
environment.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Trusted  Computing  (TC)  is  a  technology  developed  and 
promoted  by  non-profit  industry  consortium  that  aims  to 
enhance the security of the trusted computing hardware and 
software building blocks.  The main goal of the consortium is 
to  come  out  with  the  specification  for  Trusted  Platform 
Module  (TPM)  [1]  and  surrounding  software  architectures 
like the TCG Software Stack (TSS) [2].  These components 
have  potentials  to  be  used  for  security  and  trust  related 
services like remote attestation and key management. 
In this paper, we will discuss about credentials to serve the 
authentication  services  of  a  client  server  network 
environment.  In  particular,  it  describes  about  the  credential 
issuance  and  other  factors  that  contribute  to  the 
implementation of such activities. Our approach is supported 
for  both  Windows  and  Linux  platform.  Hence,  in  the  first 
contribution  the  question  how  trust  relationships  between 
remote  platforms  can  be  established  by  using  TC  is 
addressed.  The  approach  presented  in  this  paper  allows 
establishing trusted communication channels by means of the 
TCG’s specified remote attestation. The approach introduces 
a  so-called  attestation  proxy  that  is  placed  in  front  of  the 
actual application and performs a mutual platform attestation 
of the two communication parties.
This paper is organized in the following way. It starts with 
brief  introduction  in  part  one,  followed  by  part  two which 
detail  out  the  client  and  server  environment  in  security 
purpose. Part three of the paper mentions about the credential 
issuance where much of the credential issuer components  is 
discussed. The development component issue are presented in 
part  four  and  finally  is  part  five  which  describes  the  basic 
architecture  of  the  attempt  containing  the  basic  system 
requirement continued by the current implementation in part 
six. The paper ends with a conclusion.
2.0 CLIENT SERVER ENVIRONMENT
Client-server  environment  is an exciting architecture  that 
helps to redefine the end users role in application systems. It 
also manages computer resources among multiple end users 
in  a  computer  network  environment.  Basically  the  client-
server environment is an approach or network design to split 
an application’s processing across multiple processors to gain 
the maximum benefit at the least cost while minimizing the 
network traffic between machines.  The key phase is to split 
the  application  processing.  In  a  client-server  mode  each 
processing works independently but in cooperation with other 
processors.  Both  rely  on  each  other  to  perform  an 
independent activity to complete the application process. The 
distinguishing feature of a client-server system environment 
is that it contains cooperative processing capabilities through 
the use of networks.
A  server  acts  as  a  process  that  resides  at  the  central 
location of resource data to provide services to one or more 
clients. The server is connected to the network and is made 
available  to  the  client.  Whereby,  a  client  is  an  intelligent 
workstation  processer  that  is  capable  on  making  request  to 
servers  to  establish  certain  application  processes.  Since  the 
server is usually the central location for critical data, adequate 
trusted  securities  need  to  be  taken  to  ensure  data  safety. 
Security  is  implemented  to  cater  the  robust  access  control, 
data  integrity,  confidentiality  and  accountability  services  in 
client server environment. The natural question resulted as a 
corollary of this, is how do we establish trusted securities in 
such a system? 
One of the approaches available is well known as trusted 
computing  network  environment  demonstrated  by  the  TCG 
specifications.  The goals of trusted computing are to protect 
the most sensitive information, such as private and symmetric 
keys, from theft or use by malicious code. Trusted computing 
assumes that  client  software is going to be compromised at 
some  time  during  its  life,  and  provide  protection  for  its 
sensitive keys in case this should happened [3]. This concept 
of trusted computing covers a rather vast set of specifications 
and standards ranging from the core trusted platform module 
to  both  processor  and  operating  system.  Within  this 
specification  a  trusted  platform  is  one  that  behaves  in  an 
expected manner for a particular purpose [4]. 
Security plays a significant role in a client-server network 
environment.  Users  are  typically  identified  with  a  user 
account,  and  system-specific  controls  can  be  mounted  on 
these  accounts  to  provide  security  mechanisms.  Security 
services  such  as  access  control  and  accountability  can  be 
implemented in this manner,  with the accounts  providing  a 
form of stable identity. Other services such as authentication 
and non-repudiation clearly also rely on the establishment and 
preservation  of  stable  identities.  Thus  most  of  the  generic 
security  services  are  reliant  on  the  provision  of  stable 
identities. This environment, by definition provides a function 
of a trusted third party who can provide assurance as to the 
identities  of  entities in the network.  With a TPM hardware 
embedded in the platform and a trusted third party in work, 
the  network  provides  integrity,  creation  and  use  of  digital 
signatures and privacy protection mechanisms. 
One of the potential security services is called by the name 
of  attestation  [5].  Attestation  is  a  process  of  assuring  that 
information  is accurate  and obviously a critical  concept  for 
the trusted platform. This is because of the trust in the system 
is  based  on  taking  measurements  and  checking  the 
measurements. If a system is not able to attest the accuracy of 
that information, then the trust to the platform does not exist. 
Attestation is closely related to authentication. In the network 
environment,  anonymous  authentication  access  could 
facilitate  the  security  mechanism.  According  to  [4],  the 
authentication  concept  performed  by  the  access  requestor 
requires  an  access  to  the  facilities  without  necessarily 
revealing their identities to external parties. This requirement 
stems from the possible need for each individual to maintain 
some degree of plausible deniability as to these presences at a 
convenor. One of the approaches to perform this requirement 
is by using Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [6].
3.0 CREDENTIAL ISSUANCE
Trusted Third Party
In  cryptography,  a  trusted  third  party  (TTP)  is  an  entity 
which facilitates  interactions  between two parties who both 
trust  the third party;  they use this trust  to secure their own 
interactions.  TTPs  are  common  in cryptographic  protocols, 
for example, a certificate authority (CA) [7].  As an example, 
imagine  two  people,  Alice  and  Bob  wish  to  communicate 
securely that use cryptography.  Alice may need to obtain a 
key that use to encrypt messages in order to send it to Bob. In 
this case,  the CA is the trusted third party  which sends the 
key to Alice and Bob.  The  key then uses by Alice to send 
secure messages to Bob as she trust the CA.
The  Public  Key  Infrastructure  (PKI)  depends  on  the 
concept of a TTP.  Nowadays, the PKI technology is widely 
used  in  computing  and  networking  environment.   A  PKI 
enables users of a basically unsecure public network such as 
the Internet to securely and privately exchange data through 
the use of a public and a private cryptographic key pair.  The 
key pair  is obtained and shared  through a TTP.   Thus,  the 
public key cryptography is also based on the digital signing of 
public keys.  In this case, however, one central authority signs 
all the public keys, and everybody trusts the central authority. 
The  authority’s  public  key  is  distributed  among  the  users, 
who can use it to verify the signatures on public keys of other 
users [8].
With certificate authorities, every user in the system trusts 
the CA through a process of digital signing since everything 
that  signed by CA is considered  trusted.  The  CA sends  its 
public keys to the users to let them verify the signature.  The 
users must submit their information (names and public keys) 
to ensure the trust is mutual to enrol  with the CA. Then the 
CA verifies the authenticity of the submitted information and 
signs  the  submitted  public  key  with  its  private  key  if 
everything  is  correct.  Finally,  all  the  signed  information  is 
sent back to the end users including with the CA signature.  
Privacy CA
In  a  verification  process,  each  TPM  has  to  generate  a 
unique  RSA  key  pair  called  Endorsement  Key  (EK). 
Authentication of a valid TPM that belongs to the platform is 
done  by certification  of  EK issued by CA or  verifier  itself 
which  have  knowledge  about  EKs  of  all  genuine  TPM. 
Basically, if a verifier wants to ensure that the platform runs 
on  a  secured  operating  system,  TPM  will  send  its 
measurements about the platform (PCR value) to the verifier. 
Then,  TPM needs  to  validate  the  PCR using  the  EK.   So, 
verifier knows PCR is valid as well as TPM itself.  However, 
there are problems on privacy issue using this way.  All the 
transaction  would become linkable  to each  other  since  two 
different verifiers can tell that they talk to the same platform 
[9].   Figure 1 illustrates this issue. 
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Figure 1:  Privacy issue on verification of secure platform.
To solve this problem, trusted computing group (TCG) has 
proposed  two  protocols  which  remotely  convince  a 
communication  partner  that  a  trusted  hardware  is  indeed  a 
trusted  hardware.  These  protocols  will  enable  two 
communication  partners  to  establish  the  other  end  in  a 
secured computing platform and therefore making sure that it 
is a safe data exchange. Some degree of privacy is provided 
by  these  remote  identification  protocols  to  users  of  the 
platform.   However,  the  communication  partners  can  only 
establish the other  end using a trusted hardware  device but 
not in a particular device [11].  These specified protocols are 
Privacy  CA and Direct  Anonymous Attestation  (DAA).   In 
this paper,  we are not discussing about DAA protocol  since 
we use Privacy CA in our implementation as prototypes. The 
Privacy CA protocol was initially used by the group to solve 
the  above  mentioned  privacy  issue  for  user  that  needs  the 
verification of the platform containing a TPM.
The Privacy CA involves TTP in each transaction and the 
party must be fully trusted by all other parties.  The Privacy 
CA is assumed to know the public parts of the Endorsement 
Keys  of  all  valid  TPM.  This  valid  TPM  refers  to  an 
uncompromised TPM. In contrasts,  a rogue TPM is a TPM 
that  has  been  compromised  and  had  its  secrets  extracted. 
Now,  whenever  a  TPM  needs  to  authenticate  itself  to  a 
verifier,  it  generates  a  second  RSA  key  pair,  called  an 
Attestation Identity Key (AIK). Then, it sends the AIK public 
key  to  the  Privacy  CA,  and  authenticates  this  public  key 
relating to the EK. The Privacy CA will issue a certificate on 
the TPM’s AIK if it finds the EK in its list.   Through this 
protocol,  there  are  two possibilities  to detect  a rogue  TPM 
[10]:  
1. If  the  distribution  of  the  EK  secret  key  which  was 
extracted from a TPM is detected and announced as a 
rogue  secret  key,  the  Privacy  CA  can  compute  the 
corresponding public key and remove it from its list of 
valid Endorsement Keys. 
2. If  the  Privacy  CA  gets  many  requests  that  are 
authorized using the same Endorsement Key, it might 
needs to reject that requests.  In practice, it’s probably 
be determined by some risk-management policy due to 
the exact threshold on requests that are allowed before 
a  TPM  is  tagged  rogue  depending  on  the  actual 
environment and applications.
4.0 TCG SOFTWARE STACK AND TBS
The  TCG  also  defines  an  accompanying  software 
infrastructure called the TCG Software Stack (TSS) as well as 
TPM  hardware.   The  TSS  is  used  by  TCG  as  interface 
between applications and the TPM (through the TPM driver). 
TSS  1.2  specification  is  provided  and  standardized  by  the 
TCG.  TSS design goals are to supply one single entry point 
to  the  TPM  functionality  (exclusive  TPM  access), 
synchronize  concurrent  TPM  access,  TPM  resource 
management  (key  slots,  authorization  sessions  etc.)  and 
building  of  TPM  commands  messages  according  to  TPM 
specification. TSS is designed as a stack of discreet modules 
with clearly defined interfaces between them.
TCG Device Driver Library (TDDL),  TSS Core Services 
(TCS) and TSS Service Provider (TSP) are software layers in 
TSS.  Every  layer  provides  different  sets  of  functionalities. 
Figure 2 shows the TCG Software Layering architecture.  The 
TCG  Device  Driver  Library  (TDDL)  is  an  intermediate 
module between the TCS and the kernel mode TPM Device 
Driver (TDD).  The TDDL supplies the conversion between 
user mode and kernel  mode.   TDDL commands are sent  at 
byte level as a stream to the TPM Device Driver.   There is 
typically one TDDL per TPM and is provided by the TPM 
manufacturer.  Access  to  the  TPM  is  exclusive  and 
synchronized via the TDDL. 
TSS Service Providers (TSP) is the top-most modules and 
provides  a rich,  object-oriented interface  for applications  to 
incorporate  the full capabilities of a TCG-enabled platform. 
The interface used by the applications to access the TSP is the 
TSS  Service  Provider  Interface  (TSPI).    While  not  an 
architecture  requirement,  it  is  intended  that  the TSP obtain 
many TCG services such as TPM byte stream generation, key 
management,  etc  from  the  TCS  [2].   It  provides  contexts 
which are used by applications to manage TPM objects such 
as policy, key, PCR and others.  Furthermore, it is provided as 
a library and used by all high-level applications, for example 
a Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) or user application. 
Therefore, the application developers do not need to have in 
depth TPM knowledge. 
Figure 2:  TCG Software Stack Architecture [12]
Microsoft has implemented a good base of functionality in 
Windows Vista using the TCG specification such as TSS by 
using Microsoft CryptoAPI as interface and BitLocker which 
uses TPM to measure boot process attributes and store keys 
from full volume data encryption.  Before Windows Vista, the 
TPM device driver and TDDL are based on vendor specific as 
well as some TSS which is supplied by vendor. Then, Vista 
comes with a basic TPM abstraction layer called TPM Base 
Services (TBS) which a Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) based 
service that only accessible from the local machine.   
TBS  provides  virtualization  of  TPM  resources  allowing 
multiple  applications  (TSS,  OS services  etc.)  to  access  the 
TPM. It allows restricted access to TPM commands on a “per 
command” basis. In TBS, the resources such as key handles 
and auth handles are replaced by virtual handles.  TBS keeps 
the mappings of handles and if TPM runs out of resources, 
TBS takes care of swapping out entities from the TPM. In this 
situation,  the virtual resource handles are not affected.   If a 
swapped out resource is used again (via its virtual  resource 
handle) the TBS tries to reload the entity into the TPM [12]. 
The TBS component is divided into four functional areas. 
They  are  Resource  Virtualization,  Command  Scheduling, 
Power  Management  and  Command  Blocking  [13].   Each 
command submitted to the TBS is associated with a specific 
entity  to  ensure  that  different  entities  cannot  access  each 
other's  resources.  This  is  accomplished  by  creating  one  or 
more  contexts for an entity,  which are then associated with 
each subsequent command submitted by that entity. Then, the 
TBS  can  execute  TPM  commands  under  the  appropriate 
context after receive the command which includes a context 
object.  An entity  creates  the  context  before  it  accesses  the 
TBS and maintains the context until it is finished performing 
TBS accesses.  For example, in the case of a TSS, the TCG 
core  services  (TCS)  component  of  the TSS would  create  a 
TBS context when it starts up, and it would keep that context 
active until it shuts down [13].
5.0 ARCHITECTURE
The overall architecture of the proposed implementation is 
depicted in Figure 3. The implementation has the following 
characteristics:
• A server machine on Linux platform has the TPM chip 
hardware.
• Client machines on Linux or Windows platform have 
TPM chip hardware.
• A trusted third party software embedded in the server 
and acts as the credential issuer uses the Privacy CA 
protocol. 
• A database  connected to the server  is to manage the 
information of the client’s credentials.
• The server and the client is connected by the network 
and coupled by a secured communication.
• TSS  and  TBS  are  softwares  performing  the  trusted 
protocols and are installed in both server and client for 
TPM application implementation.
Figure 3:  Basic Implementation Architecture
The server serves as the manager to the client in regards to 
the credential issuance procedure. Request made by the client 
through the web services is acknowledged by the server for 
the  credential  procedure  in  a  secured  connection 
communication.  The  server  inquires the credential  from the 
credential  issuer  that  is  the  trusted  third  party.  The  trusted 
third party grants the credential to the server while the server 
replies  the  credential  to  the  client  through  secure 
communication channel. 
In order to fulfil the management of credentials for clients, 
the server needs a database to store and clear the information 
of the credentials which is requested by the clients. The server 
has  the  requirements  to  request  and  revoke  that  offers  the 
possibility  to  record  and  eliminate  the  credential’s 
information from the database.
6.0 CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION
Referring  to  the  above  architecture,  installation  of  all 
components must be established in order to proceed with the 
development.  The  current  phase  of  implementation  setup is 
focusing  on  providing  the  environment  development  for 
server and the trusted third party.
These software packages installation and configuration are 
required to facilitate the above mentioned components:
• Qt  as  a  cross-platform  application  framework  for 
desktop  and  embedded  development.  This  software 
includes  an  intuitive  API  and  C++  class  library 
integrated tools for client and server GUI development 
in this research.   More  of  the  Qt can be found here 
[14]. This research uses Qt4 version.
• Secure communication channel  and reliable transport 
protocol  to  establish  a  reliable  communication 
between  server  and  client.  This  is  to  ensure  the 
security of the data throughout the application process 
as well as protecting it during the credential issuance. 
• OpenSSL [15] as an open source toolkit implementing 
the  Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport 
Layer  Security  (TLS  v1)  protocols,  including  the 
necessary cryptographic operations.  The functionality 
provided  by  an  OpenSSL  engine  allows  the 
implementation of certificates issuance in this research 
development.  
• TrouSerS TCG Software Stack [2] to provide an API 
to the operating systems and applications to implement 
the functionality provided by the TPM. 
• The  TrouSerS  TPM  Tools [16]  is  implemented  for 
testing to check TPM capability on TPM hardware and 
software.  This tool  is a set of open source programs 
that  provides  commands  allowing  a  platform 
administrator  to  manage  and  diagnose  the  TPM 
resident on a platform. 
• TPM  Device  Driver  is  required  in  order  to  use  the 
TPM after Linux bootstrapped.  This is necessary for 
both hardware and software TPM implementation. For 
TPM  hardware  module  implementation,  the  device 
driver is specified to the TPM manufacturer. While for 
TPM software implementation,  the device driver can 
be  obtained  by  installing  the  TPM  Emulator.  This 
research  development  is  currently  been  done  on  an 
Intel  machine  provided  with  Infineon  TPM chip  [1]
[2]. The experiment outputs are shown in Figure 4 and 
5. 
Figure 4: Console command to locate existence of the TPM 
Device Driver.
Figure 5: Console display the detected PCR value.
• TPM Manager  as  a  realization  of  open  source  TPM 
management  software  that  provides  an  easy-to-use 
graphical user interface. TPM Manager is installed and 
run  to  for  experiment.  The  experiment  outputs  are 
shown in Figure 6, 7, and 8.
Figure 6: TPM Manager interface display the TPM TSS Status.
Figure 7: TPM Manager interface display the TPM and TSS 
Details.
Figure 8: TPM Manager interface display the detected PCR value.
7.0 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper describes in general  the implementation setup 
requirement of current research progress in identity credential 
issuance  system.  The  software  components  that  have  been 
installed and  configured are  the  Qt software,  the  OpenSSL 
engine,  the  TrouSerS  TCG  Software  Stack,  the  TrouSerS 
TPM Tools, the TPM Device Driver, the TPM Emulator and 
the  TPM  Manager.  The  future  works  will  focus  on  the 
challenge in implementing the trust and secure of the trusted 
third party in order to generate credentials as well as dealing 
with different  types of attestation protocol.  In addition,  this 
research  will  also  reach  on  the  development  of  the  client 
application in Windows platform.
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